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THE ROLE OF ENCODING SPECIFICITY IN INCIDENTAL LEARNING: 




This research investigated false memories via spreading activation and the 
influence of encoding specificity on explicit and implicit memory tests in incidental 
learning situations. It was hypothesized that congruent conditions would have higher 
rates of both false memories for associated items as well as more accurate memories for 
presented items. It was also expected that this effect would be larger among those in 
implicit memory conditions compared to explicit conditions. The participants (n=175) 
were presented with Deese-Roediger-McDermott semantically associated word lists via a 
Stroop task, in which they were not told to remember the words presented, but to instead 
identify the font color of the word. The font color of the presented word lists was either 
the same (congruent) between the learning and memory tests, or it was different 
(incongruent). With respect to false memory, a significant interaction for memory 
condition and font color was found, such that those in the implicit condition had more 
false memories for non-presented words when in the incongruent font color condition, 
and those in the explicit condition had more false memories when in the congruent font 
color condition. Regarding memory accuracy, both those in the implicit and explicit 
iii 
 
conditions had more accurate memories when in the congruent font color condition. 
Overall, the explicit condition had more false memories and more accurate memories 
than those in the implicit condition. This research shows that significant differences exist 
among implicit and explicit false memories regarding the effects of encoding specificity 
in incidental learning situations.  
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The Role of Encoding Specificity in Incidental Learning: 
Implications for Explicit and Implicit False Memories 
 
Most people are familiar with the fact that our memories are far from perfect. 
However, most people are less familiar with how perceptual features and the differences 
among the kinds long-term memory affect our memories. Our memory is prone to errors, 
deviations, and distortions that are often referred to as false memories (Fairfield, 
Colangelo, Mammarella, Di Domenico, & Cornoldi, 2017). A false memory is a memory 
that is different from what actually happened. The broad aim of this study is to 
understand the cognitive mechanisms that contribute to false memories. Some aspects 
that affect false memories are perceptual features of information (Kellogg, 2001; Vaidya, 
Gabrieli, Verfaellie, Fleischman, & Askari, 1998). 
Perceptual features of memories are facets within a memory that are obtained 
through the sensory system (e.g. visual information, auditory information, olfactory 
information, etc.). Perceptual features can aid one’s memory, as memory is facilitated 
when the learning and retrieval conditions overlap, a phenomenon known as encoding 
specificity. It is often the case that perceptual features are learned without one’s 
awareness or intent, or incidentally. However, the role of perceptual features and 
encoding specificity are unknown for false memories. In addition, it is possible that the 
different types of memory systems (i.e. explicit and implicit) are affected differently by 
encoding specificity for false memories (Ko, Duda, Hussey, Mason, & Ally, 2014; 
McKone & Murphy, 2000; Sbicigo, Janczura, & de Salles, 2017). This research will 





memories differently? The current study addresses this question by presenting 
information that varies in perceptual features that people are not instructed to learn (e.g. 
incidental learning). The goal is to identify whether these perceptual features affect the 
creation of false memories differently when the perceptual features match or differ (e.g. 
encoding specificity) between learning and retrieval for explicit and implicit memory 
conditions. A review of the literature discusses false memory research, types of long-term 
memory, incidental learning, and encoding specificity. 
False Memory Research 
Research is necessary in order to further understand false memories and how they 
affect our lives. Researchers study false memories in a multitude of different ways, such 
as examining how the framing of questions can affect retrieval and reconstruction of 
memories (Loftus & Palmer, 1974), how exposure to information can lead to the creation 
of an entire event that never happened (Coan, 1997; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), and how 
mental representations of concepts can cause false memories (e.g. Brewer & Treyens, 
1981; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). For the purposes of this paper, the creation of false 
memories via the relationship of mental representations will be highlighted. 
The semantic organization of mental representations via the semantic network 
may lead to the creation of false memories. For example, Brewer and Treyens (1981) 
found that participants falsely remembered items as being present in an office room, 
when they were in fact not present at all. The researchers attributed these results to the 
schemata, or the mental representations of concepts as a way of organizing information. 





Semantic associates are items that are related in meaning and are connected in the 
semantic network within our brains. An office room and other items that were present in 
an office room (i.e. a desk, writing utensils, an office chair, etc.) are semantically 
associated to the items that were falsely remembered (i.e. books). This is a real world 
example of false memories brought on by the activation of semantic associates. 
Semantic associates, due to the linkage between information within the semantic 
network, often lead to intrusion errors, as the associated items (i.e. a desk, writing 
utensils, an office chair, etc.) lead to the spontaneous intrusion of other semantically 
related ideas (i.e. books). This intrusion is known as an intrusion error, which is one way 
that false memories can occur. An important next step in false memory research is to look 
more deeply into the underlying cognitive mechanisms behind intrusion errors to 
understand more about this type of false memory. There are multiple methodologies to 
address this research, however, perhaps the best and most widely used method is the 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) list learning paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. The DRM paradigm is widely used due 
to its relevance regarding false memories caused by intrusion errors. In most studies that 
employ the DRM paradigm, researchers present a specially designed list of words to 
participants that they are later tested upon. The words in this list are special because they 
are semantically related to each other. For example, researchers present the words 
“glass”, “pane”, “shade”, and “ledge” and other words related to the concept “window” to 





critical word or critical lure), in this case “window”, is not presented. Yet, studies 
consistently observe that participants spontaneously and falsely recall and remember the 
critical word, “window”, from the list (McDermott, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Smith & Randall, 2011). In other words, the DRM word lists consistently produce false 
memories of the critical words in the form of intrusion errors. 
Theories of False Memories 
There are two main theories explaining how false memories occur in the DRM 
paradigm: the fuzzy-trace theory and the activation-monitoring theory. The fuzzy-trace 
theory (FTT) accounts for false memories by gist traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Gist 
traces are basic essence memories while verbatim memories are exact memories 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). For example, if someone were to misplace their keys, a gist 
trace would be thinking that the keys are on the key hook just because that is where they 
usually are and there is a faint memory of them being there. The problem with gist traces 
is that they can be wrong and can lead to error, as they are reliant on faint memory traces. 
Let’s say that the keys were in fact on the kitchen counter and there is a precise and exact 
memory of them being there. This would be a verbatim memory because the memory 
accurately represents exactly what happened. If a verbatim trace is present, it is thought 
to be prioritized over present gist traces. According to FTT, gist traces occur when 
verbatim traces are not strong enough, resulting in an increase in false memories 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). 
Although FTT can account for some aspects of false memory creation, there is 





monitoring theory. The basis of the activation-monitoring theory are two cognitive 
processes: spreading activation and monitoring (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 
2001). The activation-monitoring theory is highlighted for the purpose of this study. 
Spreading activation. Spreading activation is a process that may contribute to the 
creation of false memories within the activation-monitoring theory. Spreading activation 
refers to the process within the semantic network in which the activation of a collection 
of cells associated with a specific concept, like “pane”, spreads to other collections of 
cells associated with related concepts, like “shade” and “window”. The semantic network 
is the network of neurons in the human brain that connect various ideas and concepts 
related via meaning, or semantically. When one semantic associate is consciously 
activated within the network, a subsequent subthreshold activation of all other associates 
(i.e. spreading activation) occurs subconsciously (Anderson & Pirolli, 1984; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 1988). 
The spreading activation in the semantic network works analogously to neural 
firing. In order for a neuron to fire, it is required that an action potential meets a threshold 
level of activation, referred to as the threshold of excitation. When discussing the 
semantic network, the threshold refers to the specific point that is required for 
information to reach consciousness; subconscious information is below the threshold 
level. For both neural firing and the consciousness threshold in the semantic network 
there is an all-or-none law. The threshold must be met; otherwise the neural firing or 
conscious activation does not occur. Exposure to a DRM list results in the conscious 





Subthreshold activation of “window” occurs as well and increases with each presentation 
of each semantically related item. When enough subthreshold activation adds up to 
breach the threshold, the activation of the non-presented word, “window”, reaches 
consciousness. Once the activation of “window” reaches consciousness, there is an 
experience of the word, even though it was internally generated by an accumulation of 
activation, rather than being presented in the outside world and perceived through the 
senses. This makes it likely to experience a false memory of the word. In other words, the 
critical word intrudes into consciousness. Thus, this type of false memory would be an 
intrusion error. 
Another example of spreading activation leading to the intrusion of falsely 
remembered information via incidental learning is the office room experiment (Brewer & 
Treyens, 1981). In this study, the instructions given to participants were to wait for the 
experiment to begin while sitting in an office room. The researchers then moved 
participants to the so-called “experimental room” and gave them a surprise memory test 
in which they were instructed to recall all the items in the office room they had just left. 
The learning of the contents in the office room was not intentional in this study; 
researchers did not provide information conveying that there would be a memory test 
based on objects present in the room. Therefore, participants were not actively trying to 
memorize the items that were present. Most participants reported remembering “books” 
as items present in the office room when in reality, there were actually no books present 
in the room at all. The recollection of “books” is in fact a false memory created by an 





conventional objects that are associated with offices, such as a desk, writing utensils, and 
an office chair. Seeing these items initially in the office room activated other related 
concepts, such as books. These items were then reactivated during the test on the room 
items, when participants were asked to recall the contents of the office room. The 
repeated activation of the neurons within the network that represent each of these 
concepts was strong enough to breach the conscious activation threshold of semantically 
associated concepts that were not actually present in the room (i.e. books). 
This process of spreading activation within the semantic network occurs among 
cell assemblies and phase sequences. Cell assemblies are groups of neurons that represent 
an individual concept, such as a desk or books. Various cell assemblies that are related to 
each other in meaning (e.g. desk and books) are grouped together in what is referred to as 
a phase sequence (e.g. in this case “office stuff”). Thus, a phase sequence is a collection 
of cell assemblies within the semantic network, indicating that a phase sequence is a 
collection of semantically related concepts. The neural connectivity between cell 
assemblies (individual concepts like desk and books) is strengthened each time a cell 
assembly concept (desk) is presented together with another cell assembly concept (books) 
(Danker & Anderson, 2010). This strengthened connection facilitates subsequent 
communication between cell assemblies (i.e. spreading activation). Ordinarily this 
process is helpful in one’s ability to think efficiently, however, this same process may 
govern the creation of false memories of semantically related concepts. 
The process of spreading activation within the semantic network occurs among 





DRM paradigm takes advantage of how information is organized in the brain 
(semantically) to induce false memories. The words from a given DRM list are 
semantically related concepts. Thus, the words on the list represent cell assemblies that 
are part of a larger phase sequence. Due to the fact that related concepts are linked 
together, when a given concept (cell assembly) is activated, all related concepts in the 
phase sequence are sent small amounts of activation (subthreshold) via spreading 
activation. With the accumulation of this activation (e.g. from words like “glass”, “pane”, 
“shade”, and “ledge”), the likelihood of a highly related item that was never presented 
(i.e. “window”) is likely to reach the necessary threshold level for one to consciously 
experience the word by having it intrude on one’s thoughts. Spreading activation has 
been used to account for the findings of numerous false memory studies stemming from 
intrusion errors (Castel, McCabe, Roediger, & Heitman, 2007; Coane, McBride, 
Raulerson, & Jordan, 2007). However, there is more to false memories, such as 
monitoring processes that occur during encoding and retrieval. 
Monitoring. Monitoring is another process that likely contributes to the creation 
of false memories via intrusion errors within the activation-monitoring theory. 
Monitoring refers to the strategic and consciously controlled supervision of one’s 
memory (McDermott & Watson, 2001; Roediger et al., 2001). Monitoring is any memory 
process of which the purpose is to determine the origins of activation (Gallo, 2010). This 
means that during encoding or retrieval, if there is a conscious attempt to determine the 





Monitoring during encoding only occurs in intentional learning situations because 
one cannot consciously determine the source of information if they are not intentionally 
learning the information. For example, when the participants were sitting in the office 
room in Brewer and Treyens (1981) they were not intentionally memorizing the items 
that were present in the room. Therefore, it was not possible for them to monitor the 
encoding of this information, because monitoring requires conscious supervision. 
However, monitoring during retrieval can occur when information was learned 
incidentally. The participants in Brewer and Treyens (1981) likely monitored the retrieval 
of the incidentally learned items in the office room, whether successfully or not. 
Monitoring processes must occur to determine whether things are actually present in the 
environment or are present in the mind due to external cues when monitoring during 
encoding (McDermott & Watson, 2001). For example, monitoring during encoding may 
occur in an intentional learning situation in which a participant is studying a DRM 
semantically associated word list. Such a situation may involve an active supervision of 
whether activation in the brain for a word (e.g. “window) is due to the presence of that 
word in the study material or due to internally generated activation. Monitoring processes 
must occur to determine whether activation is due to an event that actually occurred or 
due to the presentation of associated items when monitoring during retrieval (McDermott 
& Watson, 2001). For example, monitoring during retrieval may occur in a situation in 
which a participant is tested on their explicit memory via a recognition test of a 
semantically related word list that they studied previously. Such a situation may involve 





activated in their brain because they previously studied it or because it is semantically 
related to other words they studied (i.e. an intrusion error). Monitoring during retrieval 
only occurs when one is using their explicit memory system because implicit memories 
are subconscious and therefore cannot be consciously monitored. 
False memories can result from errors in monitoring processes, or failing to 
accurately monitor the source of the activation that lead to a memory (Gallo & Roediger, 
2002). Monitoring has been found to increase correct recollections while decreasing the 
frequency of false memories (Gallo, 2010). Research has found that manipulating the 
monitoring process influences the accuracy of one’s memory and the frequency of false 
memories. For example, altering the way information is stored in one’s long term 
memory and repeated testing can affect the monitoring process. 
Presenting DRM lists in a blocked fashion rather than in random order increased 
both correct and false memories (McDermott, 1996). In other words, presenting blocked 
lists improved memory for the lists but also increased the rate of false memories. 
Information in a blocked fashion means that things are presented in groups, in this case, 
semantically associated lists being presented sequentially. Blocked lists alter the 
monitoring processes during encoding because it changes the way the information is 
organized and stored in long-term memory. When semantically related word lists are 
presented in a blocked fashion, they are stored together not only semantically, but 
temporally. Therefore, researchers can facilitate monitoring, which can result in more 
memories. The reason that both correct and false memories increased with this 





associations (i.e. temporal and semantic). However, it also strengthens the connections to 
other related information that was not actually present (Castel et al., 2007). These results 
show that monitoring processes at encoding influence false memories. Altering the way 
that information is stored within the long-term memory, such as blocked list presentation, 
increases both accurate and false memories. 
The monitoring process can be influenced by repeated testing. Repeated testing 
resulted in more accurate memories and less false memories (McDermott, 1996). 
Repeated testing alters the monitoring processes during retrieval due to more frequent 
retrieval of the information after being stored in long-term memory. Repeated retrieval 
can make it easier to access information because the retrieval pathway within the cortex 
becomes stronger each time it is accessed. This strengthening of the retrieval pathway 
results in faster retrieval of the information (i.e. neurons that fire together, wire together). 
These results show that monitoring processes at retrieval influence false memories 
because repeated testing resulted in more accurate memories and less false memories. 
Types of Long-term Memory 
False memories via intrusion errors can affect different long-term memory 
systems. The composition of long-term memory consists of two main types of memories: 
explicit and implicit. Explicit memories are those that we can consciously retrieve and of 
which we are aware. Implicit memories are a bit more enigmatic in that we are not 
cognizant of them and are unaware of when they are affecting our behavior. An overview 





Explicit memory. Explicit memories require conscious thought. Explicit memory 
and declarative memory are synonymous because you can consciously declare the 
contents of explicit memories. For example, the questions “what did you do for your 
birthday” or “what is your name” result in explicit memories because the answers are 
things of which most people are consciously aware. Within explicit memories, there are 
various subtypes of memory, two of which being episodic and semantic memories. 
Episodic memories are explicit memories in which people are able to recall contextual 
information (e.g. sensory, temporal, and spatial information) associated with the memory 
of the event. So in this case, the answer to “what did you do for your birthday” would 
contain contextual information such as, who was present, what you did, the type of cake 
(and perhaps the taste of it), and perhaps the auditory experience of the happy birthday 
song. 
Semantic memories, on the other hand, are explicit memories in which one is able 
to recall information, such as facts and other knowledge that is not associated with 
contextual information (e.g. sensory, temporal, and spatial information) of the memory of 
this event. So in this case, the answer to “what is your name” is not associated with you 
remembering the actual circumstance of when you learned your name, you simply are 
able to state your name. 
Contextual information is not necessary in order to know, for example, that the 
word “window” and the word “pane” are associated. However, a connection forms 
between semantic memories and episodic memories if one can remember learning about 





someone is doing a task in which they are to learn word lists, whether purposefully or 
incidentally, of semantically related items, such as “window” and “pane”. Meanwhile, 
there is specific contextual information occurring at the same time, such as the smell of 
lavender. The information that is being learned (i.e. “window” and “pane”) is becoming 
associated with the contextual information (i.e. the smell of lavender) within the cortex. 
Knowledge becomes stronger and more resilient with more connections within the 
semantic network when such associations occur between the two types of explicit 
memories. 
Implicit memory. Implicit memories, on the other hand, are memories that are 
subconscious. This type of memory is non-declarative, meaning declaration of the 
contents of implicit memories cannot happen. This type of memory can change behavior 
and thoughts unknowingly. Like explicit memory, there are different types of implicit 
memory: procedural memory, learning through conditioning, and priming. The implicit 
memory type of relevance to the current project is priming and is detailed below.   
Priming. Priming is a subconscious change in behavior that is the result of a 
presented stimulus influencing response patterns to either the same stimulus or a related 
stimulus that is presented after. For example, let’s say someone is participating in an 
experiment on a computer in which the purpose is to indicate the colors of pictures of 
objects. Before the person is presented with a picture of a banana, the computer screen 
turns yellow for a short amount of time. Afterwards, the person may be able to indicate 
that the banana is yellow more quickly than if the computer screen did not turn yellow 





reliving of an experience, making it a product of implicit memory rather than explicit 
memory (Ko et al., 2014). Reliable priming occurs in various cognitive tasks through 
implicit false memories using the DRM paradigm (Garner & Howe, 2014; Howe, Garner, 
Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010; Howe, Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013; McDermott, 
1997; Sherman & Jordan, 2011). In these cases, the experiment consisted of presentation 
of semantically associated words (e.g. “pane”, “shade”, “ledge”) and the critical word 
(e.g. “window”) was the answer to an implicit memory task. Various word association 
tasks have been used (Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Sherman & Jordan, 
2011) in order to test the priming effects of false memories. 
Priming occurs subconsciously and unbeknownst to the person. The person 
undergoing the priming does not control the differences in behavior that may result. 
There are many kinds of priming, two of which being conceptual priming and perceptual 
priming. Either conceptual or perceptual implicit memory tests can measure these kinds 
of priming. Conceptual implicit memory tests are tasks that require subconscious 
relationships to be made about concepts, such as a word association task. The instructions 
for this task are to come up with as many associated words as possible to a word, such as 
“pane”. If participants can make associations to the critical word, “window”, conceptual 
priming has taken place. Perceptual implicit memory tests feature perceptual cues, such 
as a word fragment task or a word stem completion task. The instructions for this task are 
to complete the stem/fragment with the first word that comes to mind, such as the stem 
“win----” or the fragment “w--do-w”. If one completes these word tasks predictively, 





The present experiment will examine perceptual priming and word stem 
completion tasks. Word stem completion tasks are an accurate measure of perceptual 
implicit memory because participants are taking in perceptual information before making 
their response and are encouraged to quickly produce the first word they think of, without 
consideration of a specific correct answer (Sbicigo et al., 2017). Therefore, a word stem 
completion task is a valid measure of perceptual implicit memories and, in turn, can 
accurately tell us whether successful perceptual priming has occurred. 
Explicit false memory research. Use of the DRM paradigm is common in 
explicit false memory research (McDermott, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Rummer, Shweppe, & Martin, 2009). There are differences between explicit and implicit 
false memories, such as a modality effect in which information presented auditorily 
reduces implicit false memories, but not explicit false memories (McKone & Murphy, 
2000). This modality effect simply means that information presented visually rather than 
auditorily increases susceptibility to implicit false memories. These findings imply that 
implicit memory retrieval might rely more on perceptual information, such as visual 
stimuli, compared to explicit memory retrieval. Additionally, with repeated presentation 
of a word list, more explicit false memories occur. However, implicit false memories do 
not show this effect (McKone & Murphy, 2000). Explicit memories are dependent on the 
conscious retrieval of information from long-term memory. Therefore, it seems apparent 






Explicit memory is tested via recall or recognition tasks and can be used to 
measure explicit false memories (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004; McDermott, 1997; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995). In a recall task, after having been presented with a list of words, 
participants are then asked to report all the words they remember being presented. In 
false memory studies, when participants report the critical word (e.g. “window”) it is a 
false memory. In a recognition test, after having been presented with a list of words, 
participants are presented with words and are asked to identify whether they are “old”, 
meaning they have been seen previously, or “new”, meaning that they have not seen that 
word yet during the experiment. In false memory studies, when participants identify a 
critical word (e.g. “window”) as “old”, it is a false memory. The current study employs a 
recognition memory test to examine explicit false memories. 
Implicit false memory research. False implicit memories of critical words occur 
when semantically associated word lists are presented (Lovden & Johansson, 2003; 
McDermott, 1997). These findings imply that the activation that spreads to the critical 
word can occur subconsciously. The use of Korsakoff’s amnesia patients is common in 
implicit memory research because although their explicit memories are affected by their 
disease, their implicit memory system often remains normally functioning (Bechara, 
Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland, & Damasio, 1995; Evrard, Colombel, Gilet, & 
Corson, 2016; Vaidya et al., 1998). This difference is due to the fact that amnesia is often 
the result of damage to the hippocampus. The hippocampus is involved only in explicit 
memories. Korsakoff’s patients have a smaller than average amount of explicit false 





people with normally functioning memory systems (Van Damme & d’Ydewalle, 2009). 
Implicit false memories do not show this effect. In addition to a damaged explicit 
memory system, part of this memory disorder is impaired relational encoding, or the 
ability to form new associations among concepts (Van Damme & d’Ydewalle, 2009). 
Thus, activation of the critical word would not occur in the explicit memory system, but 
activation would occur within the implicit memory system. Therefore, implicit false 
memories are susceptible to all kinds of relationships (e.g. perceptual and conceptual) 
among concepts within amnesiac patients as well as those with normally functioning 
memory systems. 
Presentation of DRM word lists is useful in studying conceptual and perceptual 
implicit false memories (McDermott, 1997). Explicit, conceptual implicit, and perceptual 
implicit false memories all occur with the presentation of DRM lists. In McDermott 
(1997), tests for these memories included a word association task, a word fragment task, 
and a word stem completion task. The presentation of semantic associates was enough to 
produce not only explicit false memories, but implicit false memories as well. However, 
the role of perceptual details that may influence explicit and implicit false memories is 
unknown. This study employs a word stem completion task to examine perceptual 
implicit false memories. 
Incidental Learning in Explicit and Implicit False Memory Tests 
Incidental learning is learning that occurs without the intention of learning. 
Incidental learning and priming may seem similar, but are different aspects of a similar 





incidental learning is a process by which one’s implicit memory can be primed. 
Incidental learning can be what happens before priming, but this is not always the case. 
For example, let us recall the participant in the experiment identifying the colors of 
pictures of objects. When the computer screen turned yellow for a short amount of time, 
the participant was not intending to learn anything about the yellow computer screen. 
However, when her response time was faster in identifying the color of a banana, the 
yellow computer screen primed her response. Therefore, although unintended, the 
participant did in fact learn about the yellow computer screen. Incidental learning 
occurred, which led to successful priming. When learning is intentional versus incidental, 
there are improvements in explicit memory but there are no effects on implicit memory 
(Neill, Beck, Bottalico, & Molloy, 1990). Information about an upcoming memory task 
resulted in the improvement of only explicit memories (Neill et al., 1990). This means 
that correct memories increase with knowledge of an upcoming explicit memory test, and 
false memories should decrease, but that such knowledge does not affect implicit 
memory. Therefore, in incidental learning studies that measure explicit memories, it is 
best to not inform participants about the following memory test. 
Incidental learning in explicit false memory tests. While intrusion errors within 
the explicit and implicit memory systems can occur when participants purposively learn 
the DRM lists, the intrusion errors that result in false memories do not require intentional 
memorization of DRM lists. Presenting the word lists as part of a stroop task is a way to 
accomplish incidental learning (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004). A stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is 





experiment stems from the task, as participants are asked to ignore the word (e.g. “red” ) 
while identifying the font color (e.g. blue). This task is one that most people find difficult 
because processing the color of the text requires people to override the automatic process 
of reading the word, as evidenced by the errors and time it takes to complete the task. The 
current study utilizes one of the many variations of the stroop task. 
Dodd and MacLeod (2004) utilized a stroop task in their false memory 
experiment. Their study included the presentation of DRM word lists in one of four 
colors (e.g. red, blue, yellow, and green). In this task participants were told to only read 
the color of the font in which the word lists were presented and to ignore the actual 
words. The participants were to indicate the color of the font by pressing a corresponding 
key on a keyboard (e.g. red=1, blue=2, yellow=3, green=4). Due to the research utilizing 
stroop tasks (Stroop, 1935), an assumption is that the participants still read and processed 
the words although the instructions explicitly stated to refrain from reading the word. The 
learning in Dodd & MacLeod (2004) is incidental because the participants processed the 
information without the goal of memorizing or even reading the word items. Yet, despite 
the lack of intention of learning the words, with a surprise explicit memory test, 
participants in the incidental learning condition recognized the critical words (e.g. 
“window”) as an old word, despite the fact that the word was actually new (Dodd & 
MacLeod, 2004). 
Participants in another incidental learning study were unable to say that they 
remembered the words or explicitly knew that they were presented, yet the test revealed 





With the presentation of DRM word lists for extremely short periods of time (either 2, 20, 
or 250 ms), participants were not confident about the presentation of certain words during 
the short-lived study phase. Despite the lack of confidence, participants still showed an 
astounding amount of false memories. The subconscious activation within the semantic 
network occurs without evidence that any learning happened at all. Both of these 
incidental learning studies show that incidental learning of DRM lists is enough to result 
in explicit false memories. This suggests that the creation of false memories via spreading 
activation of semantically related associates can occur subconsciously, but lead to 
conscious recollections of false events. 
Incidental learning in implicit false memory tests. Incidental learning can also 
affect implicit memory. There is little literature that delves into the connection between 
these two phenomena. However, the research that has been done shows that incidental 
learning can indeed prime implicit memory (Tajika, Neumann, Hamajima, & Iwahara, 
2005). For example, participants were presented with semantically associated word lists 
and one of three types of instructions: control instructions, imagery instructions, or 
imagery plus writing instructions. The imagery instructions consisted of imagining a 
visual representation of other related words, while the imagery plus writing instructions 
added having to write down the related words they imagined. This is an example of 
incidental learning because the goal of the task was not to memorize or learn the 
presented word lists. Implicit memory tests revealed that for all three groups there was an 
equivalent amount of priming for critical non-presented words and actually presented 





this group had more recognition for actually presented words than critical non-presented 
words. It is not only suggested that incidental learning has great effects on implicit 
memory, but also that perhaps the activation of implicit false memories is more 
susceptible to perceptual aspects (e.g. visual information) compared to explicit memory. 
Encoding Specificity 
Encoding specificity is the idea that memories are context-dependent, meaning 
that if contextual conditions during learning and test are similar, there is a facilitation of 
retrieval of long-term memories, more so than if conditions are different (Tulving, 1974; 
Tulving & Thompson, 1973). Encoding specificity effects are not completely dependent 
on completely identical conditions across learning and test. For example, scuba divers 
were asked to learn information while either on dry land or underwater (Godden & 
Baddeley, 1975). An assumption is that the scuba divers were cold when underwater. 
Upon being tested, the divers who were underwater experienced facilitated retrieval of 
the information with the simultaneous presentation of cold-related thoughts. A 
connection was made between the information that was learned underwater and thoughts 
about being cold. This means the encoding and storage of information happens together 
so there is a facilitation of retrieval when contextual information is present. 
  Encoding specificity effects are due to the storage of information in the semantic 
network. Upon learning information, not only is there storage of the intended 
information, but there is also storage of aspects of the learning context along with the 
intended information. Arguably, there are connections among all the stored intentionally 





term memory via neural connections within the semantic network. Associations form 
between categories for information with other cell assemblies associated with the 
category, such as associations forming between cold-related thoughts and the intended 
information for scuba divers learning underwater (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). 
Encoding specificity effects can occur in a wide variety of conditions such as 
through perceptual features (Vaidya et al., 1998), environmental factors (Grant, Bredahl, 
Clay, Ferrie, Groves, McDorman, & Dark, 1998) and modality of presentation (Kellogg, 
2001). One perceptual feature that can have an effect on encoding specificity if 
information is presented in a visual text format is font color (Vaidya et al. 1998). What 
this means is that people should attempt to have congruent conditions across learning 
(encoding) and retrieval in order to improve their memory for learned information. 
For example, if one intends to learn information about horses and the presentation 
of the information is in a pink font, the same pink font should be used when tested on the 
same information about horses. This congruence should facilitate retrieval of the 
information more so than if the font color was different, such as green. If aspects such as 
these are congruent, memory is better. This is due to the fact that the encoding and 
storage of information is synchronized, there is a facilitation of retrieval when contextual 
information is present. After learning the information about horses, it is stored in the 
semantic network where there may be information about donkeys and mules or other 
semantically related concepts. Additionally and important to this study is that a link also 
exists between the horse information and the pink font. The connection that is made 





spreading activation throughout the brain. This facilitates retrieval because there are 
multiple pathways to the target information. Reliance on pure memorization of the 
information is not necessary when the connections to the information are rich with 
contextual details, making them more easily accessible. Upon test on the horse 
information, if the testing font is pink then the connection between the horse information 
and pink font is more likely to be activated and thus, strong enough to facilitate retrieval. 
If the font had been green during the test, the connection would not have been activated 
in the semantic network and the information about horses would be more difficult to 
retrieve. 
The activation process within the activation-monitoring theory and encoding 
specificity go hand-in-hand. If concepts are related in multiple ways, the activation of 
multiple cell assemblies and potentially multiple phase sequences strengthens the 
connection between them. If related both semantically and physically, the cell assemblies 
representing word associates (e.g. “pane”, “shade”, “ledge”) become part of an even 
larger phase sequence, which now includes those physical characteristics and the brain 
regions associated with them (Danker & Anderson, 2010). The physical characteristics in 
this circumstance can be any sensory information. The strengthening of the connection 
and the increased spreading that occurs with the inclusion of physical similarities among 
concepts results in an increased subconscious activation of non-presented semantic 
associates (e.g. “window”). Although some research exists, there is not sufficient 





Explicit encoding specificity. Encoding specificity is an important variable in 
explicit memory (Ray & Reingold, 2003). People are more confident in their explicit 
memories when representations in their mind are more substantial (Craik, Rose, & Gopie, 
2015). A way of making neural representations of concepts stronger is to provide more 
similarities and relationships among them, such as perceptual characteristics. Concepts 
with weak neural representations are not sufficient to support explicit memory, but can be 
enough to support implicit memory (Craik et al., 2015). Theories such as this support the 
idea that implicit memories are more susceptible to perceptual specificity. Therefore, if 
learning and testing occur in congruent conditions, stronger implicit memories should 
result, more so than if conditions are incongruent. However, these strong effects are not 
present in explicit memories. 
Implicit encoding specificity. Implicit memories are more sensitive to perceptual 
information, such as color, than conceptual information (Engelkamp, Zimmer, & Vega 
2001; Tajika et al., 2005). Similarly, color produces a priming effect in perceptual 
implicit memory (Hupbach, Melzer, & Hardt, 2006). Color is a reliable method of 
showing the effects of encoding specificity within implicit memories. More research on 
encoding specificity must be done in order to determine the effects of perceptual 
characteristics on perceptual implicit false memories. Perhaps implicit memory is more 







The issue of false memories is one that has far reaching implications. False 
memories occur when learning is incidental (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004; Seamon et al., 
1998) and can occur in explicit (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004) and implicit (McDermott, 
1997; Neill et al., 1990) tests. It is also known that encoding specificity helps people 
remember when the test condition matches the learning condition (Tulving, 1974; 
Tulving & Thompson, 1973) and that more spreading activation leads to more false 
memories (Castel et al., 2007). However, there is little knowledge regarding the 
implication for false memories as a result of incidental learning concerning the encoding 
specificity effect. Arguably, encoding specificity should not affect false memories 
because the “learning” never happened. Yet, the activation-monitoring theory may argue 
that indeed false memories may be rich with details associated with the learning of 
similar items and that these memories are very dependent on the monitoring processes 
involved in encoding and retrieval. 
The current study addresses the role of encoding specificity in incidental learning 
and its implications for explicit and implicit false memories. In this study, participants 
incidentally learned the contents of DRM word lists via a stroop task. Like Dodd and 
MacLeod’s study (2004), participants were asked to identify the font color of a word 
while ignoring the word itself. However, in contrast to Dodd and MacLeod, who 
presented a given word list in all possible colors, the present study links a given word list 





as “glass”, “pane”, “shade”, and “ledge” were in blue), counterbalanced between 
subjects. 
To examine the role of encoding specificity on explicit and implicit memory, one 
of two different tests were presented to participants, an explicit test or a perceptual 
implicit test. Like Dodd and MacLeod’s study (2004), an explicit recognition test was be 
used. In Dodd and MacLeod (2004), the test items were presented in a neutral font color 
that did not match the original font color from the color identification phase. The current 
study adds an encoding specificity component, where for some word lists, presentation of 
the items was in a neutral (incongruent) font color or in a font color that matches 
(congruent) the font color from the encoding phase. In the congruent font color condition, 
it was expected that there will be a formation of associations among the font color (i.e. 
blue) and the critical word (i.e. “window”) within the semantic network. Given the nature 
of encoding specificity, expectations were that during the recognition test, participants 
would have more correct memories for words like “glass”, “pane”, “shade”, and “ledge” 
when presentation is in a congruent font color (i.e. blue) compared to the neutral 
(incongruent) font color. It was also expected that with the presentation of the critical 
word (i.e. “window”) in the recognition test, participants would be more likely to have a 
false memory when it too was presented in the font color (i.e. blue) that matches its 
semantically associated words, as compared to when the test items were presented in a 
neutral (incongruent) font color. Thus, it was expected that when the test conditions 





“glass”, “pane”, “shade”, “ledge”, etc.) and more false memories for the critical word 
(e.g. “window”) compared to incongruent font color conditions. 
This study sought to address the differences between explicit and implicit false 
memories, and thus also employed an implicit memory component. Due to past research 
(Engelkamp et al., 2001; Hupbach et al., 2006) suggesting that implicit memories are 
more susceptible to neurological spreading in regards to perceptual information, 
expectations were that false memories would occur at higher rates in the implicit test 
compared to the explicit test. In the implicit test, after incidentally learning the DRM 
words via the stroop task, participants completed a word stem completion task (see 
McDermott, 1997). The word stems were either in a congruent font color as presented in 
the color identification phase, or were presented in an incongruent font color. Like the 
explicit test, expectations were that those in the implicit test would have higher accuracy 
for presented words and more false memories when the conditions were congruent from 
color identification to test phase compared to incongruent font color conditions. 
However, there was a difference in expectations between the explicit and implicit 
conditions: significantly more false memories and accurate memories in the implicit 
memory condition. 
The past literature on false memories has not addressed whether incidental or 
subconscious learning of DRM lists would result in both explicit and implicit false 
memories, or a difference between the two. Additionally, considering the findings that 





memories, congruent font color between color identification and test should yield more 
implicit false memories than explicit false memories. 
Hypotheses/Predictions 
Hypothesis 1a. I expected an interaction effect between test type and font color in 
false memory frequency. I hypothesized that when participants are tested on their implicit 
memory, they would have more false memories than those being tested on their explicit 
memory if the font color was congruent between color identification and test. I expected 
that if participants were tested in an implicit test, congruent font color would facilitate 
spreading activation and thus, would lead to more false memories compared to those 
tested in an explicit test. This prediction is in line with findings suggesting that implicit 
memories are more reliant on perceptual information than explicit memories (Engelkamp 
et al., 2001; Hupbach et al., 2006; Tajika et al., 2005; Vaidya et al., 1998) and that more 
spreading activation can also lead to more memory errors (Castel et al., 2007; Gallo, 
2010; Roediger et al., 2001). 
Hypothesis 1b. I expected a main effect of test type in false memory frequency. 
In this incidental learning situation, I hypothesized that if participants were tested in an 
implicit test, they would have a higher rate of false memories compared to those tested in 
an explicit test. This prediction is in line with findings that incidental learning leads to 
more implicit memories than explicit memories (Neill et al., 1990, Tajika et al., 2005) 
and that more spreading activation can also lead to more memory errors (Castel et al., 





Hypothesis 1c. I expected a main effect of font color and false memories. I 
hypothesized that when participants were in congruent font color conditions, they would 
have a higher frequency of false memories compared to when they were in incongruent 
font color conditions. This prediction is in line with the theory of encoding specificity, 
such that congruent conditions at encoding and retrieval facilitates memory (Godden & 
Baddeley, 1975; Grant et al., 1998; Tulving, 1974; Tulving & Thompson, 1973) and that 
more spreading activation can also lead to more memory errors (Castel et al., 2007; 
Gallo, 2010; Roediger et al., 2001). 
Hypothesis 2a. I expected an interaction effect between test type and font color in 
memory accuracy. I hypothesized that when participants were tested on their implicit 
memory, they would have greater memory accuracy than those being tested on their 
explicit memory if the font color was congruent between color identification and test. I 
expected that if participants were tested in an implicit test, congruent font color would 
facilitate spreading activation and thus, would lead to more accurate memories compared 
to those tested in an explicit test. This prediction is in line with findings suggesting that 
implicit memories are more reliant on perceptual information than explicit memories 
(Engelkamp et al., 2001; Hupbach et al., 2006; Tajika et al., 2005; Vaidya et al., 1998). 
Hypothesis 2b. I expected a main effect of test type in accuracy. In this incidental 
learning situation, I hypothesized that when participants were tested in an implicit test, 
they would have greater memory accuracy compared to those tested in an explicit test. 





explicit memories, but does not affect the accuracy of implicit memories (Neill et al., 
1990). 
Hypothesis 2c. I expected a main effect of font color and memory accuracy. I 
hypothesized that when participants were in congruent font color conditions, they would 
have greater memory accuracy compared to when they were in incongruent font color 
conditions. This prediction is in line with the theory of encoding specificity, such that 
congruent conditions at encoding and retrieval facilitates memory (Godden & Baddeley, 




The participants in this experiment were 175 Humboldt State University students. 
The sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis, using a power level 
of 0.8 and an effect size of 0.5. Participants consisted of 131 females and their ages 
ranged from 18-46 years old, (M = 20.94, SD = 4.35), all of whom reported having 
normal color vision. The participants received course credit or extra credit in their 
psychology courses for participating in this experiment. 
Materials 
Four DRM lists that are known to elicit high levels of false memories (from 
Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999) composed of 15-items each were used and are 





included 8 filler word items: anger, chair, flag, shoe, king, needle, rubber, spider. The 
filler words were taken from other unrelated DRM lists (Stadler et al., 1999). 
Design 
 This study was an experimental 2 (memory test) x 2 (font color) mixed-subjects 
design. The variable memory test was a between-subjects factor with two levels: explicit 
test (recognition test) and perceptual implicit test (word stem completion task). In the 
recognition test, instructions to participants were to identify whether a given word was 
originally presented during the color identification phase (e.g. old) or whether it is a word 
that was not previously presented (e.g. new). The implicit memory test was a word stem 
completion task. Participants were presented with word stems composed of three initial 
letters and were asked to complete the word stems quickly with the first word that came 
to mind. 
The variable font color was a within-subjects factor with two levels: congruent 
and incongruent. The font colors used in this experiment were red, blue, green, and 
yellow. In the congruent condition, the word lists were presented in the same font color in 
the color identification phase and at test. In the incongruent condition, the font color at 
test was presented in a neutral font (i.e. white) that was never presented in the color 
identification phase. 
The dependent measures in this experiment were recognition memory accuracy 
(percent correct) of list items in the explicit test, word stem accuracy (percent reliable 





memories to the critical word in the recognition test), false implicit memory rate (percent 
critical words used to complete word stems), and reaction time. 
Procedure 
Participants engaged in the experiment individually in a lab suite. Both verbal and 
text instructions were provided for all participants on how to make color judgements in 
the color identification task. 
Presentation of the word lists was via a stroop task for all participants, following 
Dodd and MacLeod (2004). Presentation of the word lists was in one of the four colors 
(red, blue, green, or yellow). Each word list had a color associated with it. In order to 
ensure familiarization with the procedure, participants engaged in 72 practice trials (as 
per Dodd & MacLeod’s study, 2004). In the practice trials the participants were presented 
with a string of asterisks (e.g. *****). Presentation of the asterisks was in a single color 
per each trial. Each of the four specific font colors corresponded to four specific keys on 
the keyboard (e.g. red=1, blue=2, green=3, yellow=4). Participants were instructed to 
indicate the color of the asterisks with the corresponding key. The color identification 
phase of the experiment was self-paced and upon each response, participants were 
presented with a row of white asterisks to indicate that the next string of asterisks would 
appear in 500 ms (as per Dodd & MacLeod, 2004). 
After the practice, participants were asked to engage in the same color 
identification task, but instead identifying the font color of asterisks, participants were 
asked to identify the font color of a text word. Participants were asked to ignore the word, 





keys from the practice trials. In total, there was 48 color identification trials (the 12 
strongest associates from each DRM list). Each of the four DRM word lists was 
presented in a single font color, counterbalanced between participants (i.e. “window” list 
in all four colors, “sleep” list in all four colors, etc, resulting in 16 total conditions). 
Common practice when utilizing DRM lists is to present all of the words from a given list 
in a specific order, from strongest to weakest associated word, such that each word is 
presented one after another until the word list is completed. However, due to the nature of 
the current study and the fact that each list corresponds to a specific color, it was 
necessary to randomize the color of the words, to avoid patterns among the colors in the 
color identification task. The current study maintains the ordering of the words from 
strongest to weakest associate, but does so at the cost of presenting an entire list 
completely before presenting the content from other lists. Thus for the current 
experiment, the four lists were presented in an intermixed fashion, but were linked in 
strength of word association. This means that the first four words that were presented 
were the strongest associates from the four semantically related word lists and were 
randomized in presentation, the second four words that were presented were the second 
strongest associates and randomized in presentation, etc. 
Participants were not forewarned of the second part of the experiment, the 
memory test. Participants were randomly assigned into one of the two different memory 
test conditions (explicit or implicit). The presented 36 items in both test conditions are as 
follows: the 4 critical words that correspond with each DRM list, 16 standard related 





8, and 9 from each list), 8 weakly related items that were not presented during the color 
identification phase (words 13 and 14 from each list), and the 8 unrelated unpresented 
filler words. There is a slight variation in the words chosen when compared to Dodd & 
MacLeod’s (2004) memory test. This was to ensure that no words with the same first 
three letters were presented during word stem completion task. 
For both memory tests, the words or word stems were in either a congruent font 
color as presented in the color identification phases or a different neutral (incongruent) 
color (i.e. white font color). Presentation of two of the DRM lists and the two associated 
critical lures were in congruent colors as presented in the color identification phase and 
presentation of the rest were in incongruent (white) colors. The congruent and 
incongruent lists varied between participants. Presentation of the eight filler words was in 
one of the five colors (red, blue, green, yellow, or white) at random. All test words were 
presented in a randomized order. 
Explicit test. Participants in the explicit test condition were tested using a 
recognition task. Participants were presented with the words in a randomized order (as 
per Dodd & MacLeod, 2004) on the center of their computer screen. The recognition was 
self-paced, meaning presentation of the words continued until participants indicated 
whether the word was new or old. Instructions were to respond “/” for old and “z” for 
new. Old indicated that the participant did remember the presentation of that word during 
the stroop task. New indicated that the participant did not remember presentation of that 





Implicit test. Participants in the implicit test engaged in a word stem completion 
task. Participants were presented with three letter initial stems on a computer screen for 
12 seconds and were instructed to quickly complete the stem with the first word that 
came to mind, following McDermott’s procedure for testing perceptual implicit false 
memories (1997). Participants typed their responses using a keyboard. 
 
Results 
Data Cleaning and Scoring 
 The data was collected via E-Prime and processed with R. Outliers for reaction 
time for both the color identification task and the recognition test were eliminated from 
the analysis and were determined as lying two standard deviations away from the mean. 
Using this criteria, 103 cases were omitted from the analysis. Additionally, three cases 
were identified as not responding to any of the word-stems and were therefore omitted 
from the analysis. 
 The implicit test data required scoring due to the open-ended nature of the task. 
Research assistants scored participants’ responses to the word-stem completion tasks as 
either accurate (“1”) or inaccurate (“0”). Two research assistants did all of the scoring, 
with each assistant scoring half of the responses. Whenever they were unsure, they came 
to a consensus before making a decision regarding a score. Both conservative and liberal 
scoring methods were used. In order for a response to be considered accurate 
conservatively, it had to be exactly the same word as the word that was expected by 





order for a response to be considered accurate liberally, it had to be the exact word that 
was expected, but misspelled, or had to contain the same base as the word (e.g. 
participant responded to the stem “sha-” with the word “shading” or “shades”). The same 
procedure took place for false memories (e.g. participants responded to the stem “sle-” 
with the word “sleep” to receive a conservative “1” or “sleeping” to receive a liberal “1”). 
A reference sheet for the research assistants was created and can be seen in Appendix B. 
 Responses to the explicit memory test are considered accurate memories if they 
are correct in identifying old words as “old” or new words as “new”. Responses to the 
implicit memory test are considered accurate memories if they are correct in responding 
to a word stem with the expected word that was presented during the color identification 
task (i.e. responding to “led-” with the word “ledge”). Responses to the explicit memory 
test are considered false memories if they respond to the critical lure word as “old”, when 
it is in fact new. Responses to the implicit memory test are considered false memories if 
they respond to the stem of the critical lure word with the critical lure word (i.e. 
responding to “win-” with “window”). 
Analyses 
The data was found to meet the assumptions of the binomial distribution. All data 
were analyzed using R (R Development Core Team, 2013) and the R packages lme4 
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, Walker, & Christensen, 2009), languageR (Baayen, 2013; cf. 
Baayen, 2008), and MuMIn (Barton, 2018). Mixed effects models were used for analysis, 
accounting for variance between individual subjects and words by deeming them as 





(independent) variables are specified per each analysis.  For each analysis ANOVAs were 
used to compare each of the models to null models, in order to obtain a X2 value. 
Analyses for Each Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis 1a. It was expected that those tested on their implicit memory would 
have more false memories if they were in the congruent font color condition, as 
compared to the explicit memory condition. For this model, the dependent variable was 
false memory frequency, while the fixed effects were memory test condition (explicit or 
implicit) and font color (congruent or incongruent) and were allowed to interact. The 
main effect results stemming from this analysis are reported under the results headings 
“Hypothesis 1b and 1c”. 
Results from the mixed effects analysis show that when scored conservatively 
(see Table 1), there was a significant difference in false memory frequency (b* = 1.33, SE 
= 0.39, z = 3.42, p < .001, Marginal R2 = .11), between those in implicit memory 
condition (M = 0.43, SD = 0.50) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.83, 
SD = 0.37) when the font color was congruent. The model was found to be a good fit 
when compared to the null model (X2(1) = 11.99, p < .001). The liberal scoring (see 
Table 2) showed the same relationship (b* = 1.29, SE = 0.40, z = 3.28, p = .001, 
Marginal R2 = .08) between those in implicit memory condition (M = 0.49, SD = 0.50) 
and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.83, SD = 0.37) when the font color 
was congruent, as the results from conservative and liberal scoring were not significantly 
different (t = -1.01, p = .31) for false memory frequency. The model was found to be a 





the interaction is not in the direction that was predicted, such that those in the implicit 
memory condition had more false memories when also in the incongruent font color 
condition compared to the congruent condition, while for the explicit memory condition 
more false memories were found in the congruent font condition compared to the 







Hypothesis 1. Conservatively scored model of false memory frequency 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value p 
(Intercept) 1.83 0.47 3.86 <.001*** 
Condition 
Implicit 
-2.07 0.30 -6.84 <.001*** 
Font Color 
Incongruent 





1.33 0.39 3.42 <.001*** 
Note. False memory frequency (Conservative) ~ (Condition + Font.Color)^2 + 







Hypothesis 1. Liberally scored model of false memory frequency 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value p 
(Intercept) 1.88 0.52 3.61 <.001*** 
Condition 
Implicit 
-1.80 0.30 -5.90 <.001*** 
Font Color 
Incongruent 





1.30 0.40 3.28 .001** 
Note. False memory frequency (Liberal) ~ (Condition + Font.Color)^2 + (1|Subject) + 







Figure 1. Hypothesis 1a. Interactions between memory condition and font color 





Hypothesis 1b. The main effect for test condition, as part of the analysis from 
results heading Hypothesis 1a predicted that those in the implicit condition would have 
more false memories than those in the explicit condition.  
Results from the mixed effects analysis showed that when scored conservatively 
(see Table 1), there was a significant difference in false memory frequency (b* = -2.07, 
SE = 0.30, z = -6.84, p <. 001), such that those in the implicit memory condition (M = 
0.48, SD = 0.50) had significantly less false memories than those in the explicit memory 
condition (M = 0.75, SD = 0.43). The liberal scoring (see Table 2) showed the same 
relationship (b* = -1.80, SE = 0.30, z = -5.90, p < .001), such that those in implicit 
memory condition (M = 0.54, SD = 0.50) had significantly less false memories than those 
in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.75, SD = 0.43). 
Hypothesis 1c. The main effect for font color condition, as part of the analysis 
from results heading Hypothesis 1a predicted that those in the congruent font color 
condition would have more false memories than those in the incongruent condition. 
Results from the mixed effects analysis showed that when scored conservatively 
(see Table 1), there was a significant difference in false memory frequency (b* = -1.00, 
SE = 0.29,  z = -3.40, p < .001) between those in the congruent condition (M = 0.65, SD = 
0.48) and those in the incongruent condition (M = 0.60, SD = 0.49), such that those in the 
congruent condition had significantly more false memories than those in the incongruent 
condition. The liberal scoring (see Table 2) showed the same relationship (b* = -1.02, SE 





had significantly more false memories than those in the incongruent condition (M = 0.63, 
SD = 0.48). 
Hypothesis 2a. It was expected that those tested on their implicit memory would 
have more accurate memories if they were in the congruent font color condition, as 
compared to those in the explicit condition. For this model, the dependent variable was 
accuracy, while the fixed effects were memory test condition (explicit or implicit) and 
font color (congruent or incongruent) and were allowed to interact. The main effect 
results stemming from this analysis are reported under the results headings “Hypothesis 
2b and 2c” 
Results from the mixed effects analysis show that when scored conservatively 
(see Table 3), there was no significant difference in memory accuracy (b* = 0.04, SE = 
0.15, z = 0.27,  p = .78, Marginal R2 = .14) between those in implicit memory condition 
(M = 0.29, SD = 0.45) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.65, SD = 0.48) 
when the font color was congruent. The model was not found to be a good fit when 
compared to the null model (X2(1) = 0.07, p = .78). The liberal scoring (see Table 4) 
showed the same relationship (b* = 0.19, SE = 0.15, z = 1.27, p = .21, Marginal R2 = .08) 
between those in implicit memory condition (M = 0.37, SD = 0.48) and those in the 
explicit memory condition (M = 0.64, SD = 0.48) when the font color was congruent, as 
compared to incongruent font color conditions. The model was not found to be a good fit 
when compared to the null model (X2(1) = 1.60, p = .21).  The difference between 
conservative and liberal scoring were significantly different (t = -3.82, p < .001) for 





memories compared when scored liberally. Figure 2 shows that the interaction is 
supportive of what was expected, although insignificantly, such that those in the implicit 
memory condition had more accurate memories when also in the congruent font color 







Hypothesis 2. Conservatively scored model of memory accuracy 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value p 
(Intercept) 0.71 0.18 4.00 <.001*** 
Condition 
Implicit 
-1.75 0.10 -18.24 <.001*** 
Font Color 
Incongruent 





0.04 0.15 0.27 .78 
Note. Interaction effects: Memory Accuracy (Conservative) ~ (Condition +Font.Color)^2 
+ (1|Subject) + (1|Word). Main effects: Memory Accuracy (Conservative) ~Condition + 







Hypothesis 2. Liberally scored model of memory accuracy 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value p 
(Intercept) 0.69 0.19 3.61 <.001*** 
Condition 
Implicit 
-1.28 0.09 -14.56 <.001*** 
Font Color 
Incongruent 





0.19 0.15 1.27 .21 
Note. Interaction effects: Memory Accuracy (Liberal) ~ (Condition + Font.Color)^2 + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Word). Main effects: Memory Accuracy (Liberal) ~ Condition + 







Figure 2. Hypothesis 2. Interactions between memory condition and font color regarding 





Hypothesis 2b. The main effect for test condition, as part of the analysis from 
results heading Hypothesis 2a predicted that those in the implicit condition would have 
more accurate memories than those in the explicit condition.  
Due to the fact that the interaction was insignificant for the memory accuracy 
model, separate analyses were done with only the main effects, in order to get better fit 
model. Results from the analysis without the interaction showed that when scored 
conservatively (see Table 3), there was a significant difference in memory accuracy (b* = 
-1.75, SE = 0.10, z = -18.24, p < .001), such that those in the implicit memory condition 
(M = 0.27, SD = 0.44) had significantly less accurate memories than those in the explicit 
memory condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49). The liberal scoring (see Table 4) showed the 
same relationship (b* = -1.28, SE = 0.09, z = -14.56, p < .001), such that those in implicit 
memory condition (M = 0.36, SD = 0.48) had significantly less accurate memories than 
those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49). 
Hypothesis 2c. The main effect for font color condition, as part of the analysis 
from results heading Hypothesis 2a predicted that those in the congruent font color 
condition would have more accurate memories than those in the incongruent condition.  
Due to the fact that the interaction was insignificant for the memory accuracy 
model, separate analyses were done with only the main effects, in order to get better fit 
model. Results from the analysis without the interaction showed that when scored 
conservatively (see Table 3), there was a significant difference in memory accuracy (b* = 
-0.26, SE = 0.08, z = -3.40, p < .001), such that those in the implicit memory condition 





memory condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49). The liberal scoring (see Table 4) showed the 
same relationship (b* = -0.20, SE = 0.07, z = -2.68, p = .007), such that those in implicit 
memory condition (M = 0.36, SD = 0.48) had significantly less accurate memories than 
those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49). 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Exploratory analyses were done looking at the 3-way interaction between memory 
test, font color, and word type on memory accuracy, to see if there is a difference in 
memory accuracy for new and old words in both congruent and incongruent font colors, 
in both the implicit and explicit memory conditions. Similar analyses were not done for 
false memory frequency, because false memory frequency only analyzes responses to 
critical words. For this model, the dependent variable was accuracy, while the fixed 
effects were memory test condition (explicit or implicit), font color (congruent or 
incongruent), and word type (old or new) and were allowed to interact. 
Results from the mixed effects analysis show that when scored conservatively 
(see Table 5), there was a significant interaction (b* = 1.69, SE = 0.36, z = 4.73, p < .001, 
Marginal R2 = .19), such that both those in implicit memory condition (M = 0.34, SD = 
0.48) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.69, SD = 0.46) had more 
accurate memories for old words when the font color was congruent, compared to those 
in implicit memory condition (M = 0.30, SD = 0.46) and those in the explicit memory 
condition (M = 0.52, SD = 0.50) in the incongruent font color condition. However, those 
in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.71, SD = 0.45) had more accurate memories for 





congruent (M = 0.56, SD = 0.50). This effect was not seen for those in the implicit 
memory condition (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34), as they had more accurate memories for new 
words when in the congruent condition, as compared to the incongruent condition (M = 
0.13, SD = 0.34). The model was found to be a good fit when compared to the null model 







Exploratory analysis. Conservatively scored model of memory accuracy 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value p 
(Intercept) 0.38 0.32 1.18 .24 
Condition 
Implicit 
-2.30 0.23 -10.2 <.001*** 
Font Color 
Incongruent 
0.76 0.18 4.27 <.001*** 









0.65 0.25 2.58 .01* 
Font Color 
Incongruent: 
Word Type Old 





Word Type Old 
1.70 0.36 4.73 <.001*** 
Note. Memory Accuracy (Conservative) ~ (Condition + Font.Color + Word Type)^3 + 






The liberal scoring (see Table 6) showed the same relationship (b* = 1.61, SE = 
0.33, z = 4.86, p < .001, Marginal R2 = .12), such that both those in implicit memory 
condition (M = 0.42, SD = 0.49) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.69, 
SD = 0.46) had more accurate memories for old words when the font color was 
congruent, compared to when those in the implicit memory condition (M = 0.41, SD = 
0.49) and those in the explicit memory condition (M = 0.52, SD = 0.50) were in the 
incongruent font color condition. However, those in the explicit memory condition (M = 
0.71, SD = 0.45) had more accurate memories for new words when the font color was 
incongruent, compared to when the font color was congruent (M = 0.56, SD = 0.50). This 
effect was not seen for those in the implicit memory condition (M = 0.22, SD = 0.42), as 
they had more accurate memories for new words when in the congruent condition, as 
compared to the incongruent condition (M = 0.23, SD = 0.42). The model was found to 







Exploratory analysis. Liberally scored model of memory accuracy 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value p 
(Intercept) 0.39 0.34 1.13 .26 
Condition 
Implicit 
-1.75 0.20 -8.55 <.001*** 
Font Color 
Incongruent 
0.77 0.18 4.26 <.001*** 









0.47 0.23 2.02 .04* 
Font Color 
Incongruent: 
Word Type Old 





Word Type Old 
1.61 0.33 4.86 <.001*** 
Note. Memory Accuracy (Liberal) ~ (Condition + Font.Color + Word Type)^3 + 








 This study examined the relationship between the types of long term memory, 
encoding specificity, false memory frequency, and memory accuracy in an incidental 
learning situation. The design and hypotheses from the current study are largely based on 
that of McDermott (1997) and Dodd and MacLeod (2004). Broadly, the results of this 
study suggest that there is indeed a meaningful relationship between these variables that 
can be seen when information is learned incidentally.  
Spreading Activation and Implicit Memory 
In 2004, Dodd and MacLeod found that participants had significant levels of 
explicit false memories when DRM word lists were learned incidentally via a Stroop task. 
The creation of false memories in this study is attributed to the process of spreading 
activation, which occurs even when information is learned incidentally. The current study 
extended upon that of Dodd and MacLeod, with the addition of an implicit memory 
condition. What was found in the current study supports what was found by Dodd and 
MacLeod because we too were able to detect significant levels of explicit false memories 
when information was learned incidentally via a Stroop task. 
In 1997, McDermott found that participants can be primed by DRM word lists to 
have significant levels of both perceptual and conceptual implicit false memories. The 
current study extended upon that of McDermott, with some differences in design. The 
most prominent difference between the studies is that McDermott (1997) did not compare 





within conceptual and perceptual implicit false memories, she did not make comparisons 
to explicit false memories. Additionally, McDermott (1997) did not execute the learning 
of word lists in an incidental fashion. McDermott (1997) found that DRM word lists can 
effectively prime the implicit memory of participants, leading many researchers to 
continue studying implicit false memories. The results from the current study support 
what McDermott found, because we were able to successfully prime participants for 
perceptual implicit false memories, however we did not look into conceptual implicit 
memories. 
Interestingly, the results from the analyses coinciding with Hypotheses 1b and 2b 
showed significantly less false memories and accurate memories for those in the implicit 
memory conditions. The relatively low amounts of implicit false memories and accurate 
memories seemingly contradicts what has been found by other researchers (e.g. Tajika et 
al., 2005). However, the results from the current study are consistent with the findings 
that implicit false memories can indeed be caused by priming of semantic associates 
(McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000). 
There are several explanations for why our results regarding perceptual implicit 
false memories were smaller than expected. One explanation is that semantic priming 
may be more short-lived than other forms of priming, such as repetition priming 
(McBride, Coane, & Raulerson, 2006). Meade, Watson, Balota, and Roediger (2007) 
found that when there are more intervening steps between learning and implicit memory 
tests, less false memories occur in semantic priming experiments, compared to when 





consistent with the theory that semantic priming is more short-lived, and thus, in order to 
test perceptual implicit false memories experimentally, there should be minimal 
intervening steps between learning and memory test. The present experiment had 
participants take a short, self-paced break in between the color identification task and the 
word-stem completion task, followed by intermediate oral instructions provided by 
research assistants. These intervening steps may contribute to the relatively low amount 
of implicit false memories found. Additionally, the fact that in the current study the DRM 
word lists were not presented in their traditional blocked fashion, this may further 
interrupt the semantic priming between learning and test. Participants were not shown 
each list in its entirety before being shown another list, and were instead shown 
equivalent associates from each list one after the other, in descending order from 
strongest to weakest associate. The way the lists were presented may have made semantic 
priming less detectable because there may have been more intermediate stimuli being 
shown between the learning and recall of the information associated to a given word list. 
Additionally, McBride et al. (2006) puts forward another possible explanation for 
our results. In implicit false memory experiments, participants are more likely to begin to 
explicitly retrieve information if they connect the study phase (even though the aim was 
to study the information incidentally) to the test phase. This is a big issue to consider, as 
it may provide alternative explanations for what was found in the current study. For 
example, if participants in the implicit condition began to recognize word stems as 
belonging to words that were also present during the color identification task, they may 





memory test if there are a small amount of non-related filler words present participants 
are more likely to consciously recognize the relationship between the words during the 
learning phase and memory test. Thus, in the present study as well as others (Tajika et al., 
2005), 8 filler words in the memory test may not be enough to keep participants in the 
dark as to the true nature of the experiment. With only 8 filler words during the implicit 
memory test, it is very possible that participants were able to see the connection between 
the items from the learning phase of the experiment and therefore responded explicitly to 
the memory test (McBride et al., 2006; Tse & Neely, 2005). 
Furthermore, something that is very important in false memory experiments is 
lexical activation. In order for lexical activation to occur, the lexical form of a word must 
be present. This means that the word in its entirety must be present, whether it be 
presented auditorily or visually in text form. If the lexical form of a word is indeed 
present during learning in perceptual implicit false memory experiments, then it may be 
repetition priming, and not semantic priming that is at work. To reiterate from earlier in 
this paper, repetition priming is the memory facilitation that occurs when an item has 
already been presented at least once. For example, if one is presented with the word 
“window” during the learning phase of an experiment, and is then tested with the 
presentation of the word “window” again (i.e. the item is repeated, hence “repetition” 
priming), the person has been primed by the presentation of the same word twice, thus 
facilitating their memory for the item. It is common practice in some false memory 
experiments to actually present the critical lure word to some conditions during the 





1997). In these cases, the lexical form of the word is actually present during the learning 
phase of the experiment and therefore, lexical activation occurs and often results in a 
large amount of priming (McDermott, 1997). For example, if some participants were 
presented with the word “window” during the learning phase and others were only 
presented with semantic associates of the word window (e.g. “shade”, “ledge”, “pane”), 
those presented with the actual word have experienced repetition priming from the lexical 
activation of the word “window” at both learning and test, while those who were 
presented with associates have experienced semantic priming. 
Additionally, researchers have found that the implicit memory system may not be 
as susceptible to semantic activation, compared to lexical activation (McBride et al., 
2006; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). What this means is that in many implicit false 
memory experiments, it may be mainly the lexical activation via repetition priming and 
not semantic activation via semantic priming that resulted in significant levels of priming 
on implicit memory tests. To further expand on this notion, Lovden and Johansson (2003) 
found that verbal articulation mediated the priming for implicit false memories. Their 
results suggest that lexical activation is an important factor to consider when testing the 
creation of implicit false memories. Therefore, the relatively low amount of implicit false 
memories and accurate memories in the present study may be due to the fact that lexical 
activation during the word stem completion task did not occur. This was not an issue with 






It is important to note that there were a significant amount of implicit false 
memories, as found in the results coinciding with Hypotheses 1b, just far less than 
expected and far less than the explicit memory condition. The fact that there was a degree 
of successful priming for implicit false memories is likely due the monitoring component 
within the activation-monitoring theory, proposed by Gallo and Roediger (2002). To 
reiterate, the monitoring process causes false memories due to errors in identifying the 
source of activation that led to a memory. Participants in this study may have made 
source monitoring errors when going through the word stem completion task. That being 
said, in order for this to occur, explicit contamination of the implicit memory would be 
necessary, because monitoring does not occur within the implicit memory system. This 
means that it is possible, as mentioned above, that participants began consciously 
retrieving words from the color identification task to complete the word stems, negating 
the implicit nature of the task. 
Encoding Specificity 
Encoding specificity states that when conditions during learning and retrieval are 
congruent, memory is facilitated. This concept has been supported by numerous studies 
(Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Grant et al., 1998; Tulving, 1974; Tulving & Thompson, 
1973), but has been understudied regarding false memories. One would think that false 
memories should behave in a similar manner as accurate memories, but this may not be 
the case. 
The results of the current study found that encoding specificity was supported in 





2c). Those in congruent conditions did have more false memories and greater memory 
accuracy than those in incongruent conditions, regardless of test condition. These results 
are in line with what was expected and what past research has found regarding encoding 
specificity (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Grant et al., 1998; Tulving, 1974; Tulving & 
Thompson, 1973). This suggests that explicit and implicit accurate and false memories 
are prone to the effects of encoding specificity. There is a lot of support for the notion 
that false memories and accurate memories behave very differently, but the results from 
the current study suggest that perhaps the two are not as different as we may think. 
However, more interesting than the main effects of this study was the interaction 
effect that was found between explicit and implicit false memories in Hypothesis 1a. In 
this experiment, participants in the implicit memory condition had significantly more 
false memories when they were also in the incongruent color condition. Not only does 
this seem to contradict what one would expect, given what has been found in support of 
encoding specificity, but it seems to suggest that perhaps the opposite is true for implicit 
false memories. The results from the current study suggest that incongruence facilitates 
the creation of implicit false memories, more so than congruence, despite the findings 
that implicit false memories are indeed context-dependent, even more so than explicit 
false memories (Tajika et al., 2005). 
Tajika et al. (2005) found when the incidental learning of information is more 
context-rich, participants have significantly more implicit false memories, even more so 
than those in the explicit memory condition who were also in the context-rich conditions. 





more false memories in congruent font color conditions. However, there are differences 
between the two experiments that may contribute to our differences in results. Tajika et 
al.’s manipulation of context (2005) was much stronger than that of the current study. 
Tajika et al. (2005) utilized different instructions to participants in order to enhance the 
context associated with learned DRM word lists (i.e. imagery instructions: imagine the 
word in your mind or imagery plus writing instructions: imagine the word in your mind 
and write it down). The participants who received more context when learning the word 
lists (i.e. imagery plus writing) had far more implicit false memories than those who 
received less context (i.e. imagery). This may be why they found such a large difference 
between explicit and implicit false memories. Therefore, a potential explanation for what 
was found in the current study is that perhaps the context manipulation in this experiment 
was too weak. 
Although previous research uses font color as a way of manipulating encoding 
specificity (Vaidya et al., 1998), more recent research has put forward the idea that 
stronger manipulations of context are needed (Smith, Handy, Hernandez, & Jacoby, 
2018). Smith et al. (2018) claim that weak manipulations of context make it difficult to 
detect contextual effects on implicit memory, because the contextual similarities are not 
enough for the subconscious to pick up on. Thus, perhaps it can be assumed that implicit 
false memories are more context-dependent than explicit false memories, but more 
evident contextual cues are needed. If this is the case, it would seem that this effect would 





findings contradict Tajika et al. (2005), because those researchers used more rich 
contextual manipulations in their study. 
Limitations 
  This study was experimental with great internal validity. Thus, there is a trade-off 
at play, resulting in lower external validity. This may mean that there is low 
generalizability to real-world experiences of false memories. Additionally, new research 
suggests that perhaps a stronger encoding specificity manipulation may have been needed 
in this study to really explore the effects on implicit memory (Smith et al., 2018). A way 
to combat this limitation in future research may be to use contextual manipulations that 
are in line with what was used in Tajika et al. (2005). Additionally, it has also been found 
that often times in implicit memory tests, participants often become test-aware (McBride 
et al., 2006), especially when a small amount of filler words are presented during the 
memory test. This research suggests that it is possible that when participants engage in 
implicit memory tests, they may become test-aware, and thus being to consciously 
retrieve information, rather than unconsciously. This is an issue because it completely 
negates the implicit intention of the experiment. Explicit contamination can lead to 
misleading results, as discussed above. To avoid this limitation in future research, more 
stringent manipulations to discourage conscious retrieval may be required. Another 
option is a post-test question asking participants if they became test-aware. Researchers 
can then remove the participants who self-identified were test-aware from the analysis. 
Additionally, due to the fact that each word list was associated with a specific 





DRM word lists in the traditional fashion. In most studies, DRM lists are presented in a 
blocked fashion with each list presented completely from strongest to weakest associate. 
The current study presented the strongest associates from each list first, followed by the 
second strongest from each list, etc until each list was presented completely. The order of 
the presentation of each associate of the same strength for each list was counterbalanced 
to avoid the emergence of patterns. Although this deviation from what is normally done 
was necessary, it is a limitation because it could have affected the results, because 
semantic priming is short-lived (McBride et al., 2006). The clustered presentation of the 
word-lists may not have resulted in the desired semantic priming because the words were 
not presented in the traditional blocked fashion, therefore the short-lived semantic 
priming may have been dormant by the time the memory test occurred. 
Implications 
 Although indirectly, this research adds to the pressing problem of false eyewitness 
testimonies in the United States. False eyewitness testimonies are the leading cause of 
wrongful conviction in the United States. Since forensic DNA tests in criminal cases 
started being used in the 1990s, hundreds of people have been exonerated. Of those 
people, over 75% were charged due to false eyewitness testimonies (Wells & Olson, 
2003). Unfortunately, some convicts have already served years worth of their sentences 
or have even been given a death sentence before they were exonerated by DNA evidence. 
These facts are staggering and force one to consider why eyewitness testimonies are still 
being used in criminal trials, given all of the research that has been done since the 1970s. 





expert witness in several court cases, using her research to explain why eyewitness 
testimonies should not be used for convictions, or should at least be used with caution. 
The work of Loftus and other false memory researchers shows just how easy it is for false 
memories to occur, deeming our memories of events extremely unreliable (Loftus & 
Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The current study 
adds to this literature because it successfully created both explicit and implicit false 
memories in participants and investigated the effects of encoding specificity. 
 Furthermore, many of the methods used by law enforcement and courts have been 
shown to increase the frequency of false memories (Douglass & Steblay, 2006). More 
specifically, the post-identification feedback effect is the idea that the comments provided 
by line-up administrators during identification of perpetrators from a line-up can greatly 
influence the likelihood of a false identification (Douglass & Steblay, 2006). For 
example, if a witness were to identify a perpetrator from a line-up and the law 
enforcement officer confirmed “yes, you’ve identified the correct suspect”, this greatly 
inflates the witness’ post-identification confidence later on in the trial. 
Other factors that are under the control of law enforcement can influence the rate 
of false eyewitness testimonies, such as the selection of the fillers used in a line-up 
(Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 1993), blind administration of the line-up (Douglass, Smith, & 
Fraser-Thill, 2005), ensuring that witnesses are aware that the actual perpetrator may not 
be present in the line-up (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Steblay, 1997), presenting potential 





Lindsay, 2001), and obtaining a statement from witnesses as to how confident they are at 
the time of identification (Luus & Wells, 1994). 
Researchers have provided recommendations and guidelines to law enforcement 
in order to minimize the frequency of false identification, many of which have not been 
adhered to. The false memory research that has and is being done by psychologists 
should be taken into account more seriously in order to prevent more wrongful 
convictions. Additionally, further false memory research should be conducted and made 
public so we can try to correct this issue in our law enforcement and judiciary system. 
Future Directions 
 In most cases when an individual is a witness in a criminal trial, the information 
that they are being explicitly asked about was often learned incidentally, as they were 
likely not attempting to memorize the information present in the environment during a 
crime. Thus, in order to learn more about false memories that can lead to false eyewitness 
testimonies, more research on false memories in incidental learning situations should be 
done, with the addition of aspects to make it more generalizable to criminal trials. For 
example, when reflecting on information when you are being questioned by police, there 
is a lot of emotion involved, such as stress and fear. These emotions have an impact on 
the retrieval of the information that was not present in the current study. 
Additionally, more research needs to be done regarding the differences among 
explicit and implicit false memories and how they are related to context, as many of the 
findings have been inconsistent. The current study found that encoding specificity effects 





future research. In regards to criminal investigations, one may interpret the interaction 
that was found for explicit false memories as indicating that incongruent conditions 
should be implemented to ensure a smaller likelihood for false recognition. This may 
mean taking witnesses away from the crime scene for interrogations to reduce the 
likelihood of false memories occuring, but this too may be problematic as there may be 
detriments to real memory recollection in an incongruent context. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the present study added to the false memory literature by examining 
the difference between false memory frequency and memory accuracy between the 
different types of long-term memory and contextual congruence in incidental learning 
situations. The incidental learning of DRM semantically associated word lists resulted in 
significant amounts of both explicit and implicit false memories as well as explicit and 
implicit accurate memories. There were differences in the rates of these variables when 
font color was either congruent or incongruent between learning and test, such that, when 
in the implicit memory condition, there were significantly more false memories when the 
font color was incongruent. When in the explicit memory condition, there were 
significantly more false memories when the font color was congruent, as was expected. 
Interestingly, the interaction was not significant for memory accuracy, such that there 
was no significant difference between explicit and implicit memory accuracy across the 
font color conditions. Overall, the explicit memory condition had significantly more false 





color condition had significantly more false and accurate memories than the incongruent 
condition. 
 The literature regarding contextual effects on implicit false memories remain 
inconsistent. While some studies show significantly greater effects on the implicit 
memory system compared to the explicit system (Tajika et al., 2005), this study shows 
the opposite effect. Several explanation for these results are put forward, such as the 
amount of intermediate steps between learning and test, the amount of filler words in the 
memory test, the importance of lexical activation, (McBride et al., 2006) and greater 
contextual manipulations may be required to uncover the true effect of context on 
implicit false memories (Smith et al., 2018). Future research should address these factors, 
as well as implement more stringent regulations in order to avoid test-awareness in 
implicit memory tests.  
 The present results help add to the body of research that has been done by 
cognitive scientists regarding the phenomenon of false memories. False memories are 
import to research because they can have extremely detrimental outcomes, such as 
wrongful convictions due to false eyewitness testimonies. The true differences between 
implicit and explicit false memories remain largely unknown and must be investigated 
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Critical Words With List Items 1 to 15 
Words from (Stadler et al., 1999), presented in order from strongest to weakest associate 
to critical word (presented in all capital letters). Items that will be presented in the 
memory tests are signified with asterisks. 
 
*SLEEP: bed, *rest, awake, *tired, dream, wake, snooze, *blanket, *doze, 
slumber, snore, nap, *peace, *yawn, drowsy 
*WINDOW: door, *glass, pane, *shade, ledge, sill, house, *open, *curtain, frame, 
view, breeze, *sash, *screen, shutter 
*ROUGH: smooth, *bumpy, road, *tough, sandpaper, jagged, ready, *coarse, 
*uneven, riders, rugged, sand, *boards, *ground, gravel 
*SMELL: nose, *breathe, sniff, *aroma, hear, see, nostril, *whiff, *scent, reek, 







Open ended answers result in a variety of responses. For the liberal scoring of the 
data, accepted alternatives were credited as accurate or indicative of a false memory, see 
table below. For conservative scoring, only the target word was credited as accurate or 
indicative of a false memory. 
Target word  Accepted alternatives 
Breathe  Breath 
Tired   Tire, Tiredness, Tires 
Bumpy  Bump 
Salts   Salt, Salty 
Boards   Board 
Anger   Angry 
Smell   Smelly, Smelling, Smelled 
Rest   Rested, Restful 
Yawn   Yawning 
Sleep   Slept 
Open   Opened, Opening 
Shoe   Shoes 
Rough   Rougher, Roughly 
Aroma   Aromatic 
Glass   Glasses 
Scent   Scented 
Doze   Dozing 
Window  Wind 
 
Words with the same base word, but different overall meaning are not accepted 
alternatives, such as “bumper” instead of “bumpy” 
Words that are misspelled are accepted alternatives if they attempted to spell the correct 
word or one of the other accepted alternatives above 
